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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is a medical malpractice case involving allegations asserted by 
Plaintiff/Appellant Heather Hall, hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff' orthe "patient." Plaintiff 
appeals the October 25,2011 summary judgment decision of the Honorable David C. Nye 
wherein he granted the Defendants/Respondents' motion for summary judgment on all 
claims. Respondents contend the decision of the District Court should be affirmed in all 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 1 
respects, because: 1) all of the patient's claims are subject to the requirements of Idaho 
Code §6-1012; 2) the affidavit of the patient's expert, Dr. David Bowman, lacks foundation 
and was therefore inadmissible pursuant to Rule 56 (e) because Dr. Bowman failed to set 
forth in his affidavit that he had adequately familiarized himself with the standard of health 
care practice applicable to any of the Respondents practicing in the emergency room 
setting in Pocatello, Idaho in 2009; 3) the opinions expressed in Dr. Bowman's affidavit are 
conclusory and not based on personal knowledge as they are improperly based on 
unsupported allegations in the complaint; 4) Idaho Code § 54-1814 is inapplicable for use 
by an expert opposing summary judgment in a civil suit for damages; and 5) the patient 
failed to establish the existence of any statewide minimum standards regarding the proper 
way to auscultate a patient's heart beat while evaluating complaints of chest pain and 
migraine headache during an emergency room examination. Because the District Court 
properly concluded that Dr. Bowman's affidavit fa iled to meet the admissibility req uirements 
of Rule 56(e) and Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, the Court properly granted the 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment on all counts. 
B. Course Of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on May 3, 2011, 
alleging claims for "Battery," "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress," "Invasion of 
Privacy," "Negligent Supervision" and "Respondeat Superior." (R. p. 4-6). The parties 
thereafter engaged in discovery after which the Defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment. (R. p. 11-16). The defense motion was supported by the affidavits of Jeff 
Johnson, P.A., Dr. Holt and Dr. Fowler In their affidavits, each of the Defendant health 
care providers set forth their actual knowledge of the local standard of health care practice 
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applicable to each of them for the time and place in question. (R. p. 19-47). The affidavits 
further state that the care and treatment of the Plaintiff by each of the Defendant health 
care providers complied in all respects with the applicable local community standard of 
health care practice for Pocatello, Idaho, in 2009. Id. 
Plaintiff opposed the defense motion with the Affidavit of Dr. David Bowman, 
an Idaho Falls, Idaho, physician of unknown specialty. (R. p. 71) Dr. Bowman claimed to 
have familiarized himself with the local standard of health care practice based on his 
experience, his review of the patient's medical records, his review of the complaint and 
consultation with anonymous physicians. (R. p. 72-73). Following oral argument on 
September 26, 2011, the District Court concluded that Dr. Bowman's affidavit lacked 
foundation and was therefore inadmissible, and thus the Plaintiff's showing was not 
adequate, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defense on all claims. (R. p. 
101-108). As part of the District Court's ruling, it found that all of Plaintiff's claims should 
be treated together as a standard medical malpractice case. (R. p. 101). 
Plaintiff did not seek reconsideration or submit a supplemental affidavit of Dr. 
Bowman correcting the deficiencies identified by the District Court. Instead, Plaintiff 
subseq uently filed a Memorand um in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Under 
Rule 59(a) on November 8, 2011; however, no motion was ever filed with the 
memorandum. (R. p. 111). Without any further court action, on December 8,2011, Plaintiff 
filed her Notice of Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 17. (R. p. 115). The defense opposed 
Plaintiffs procedurally improper Rule 59 (a) submission. (R. p. 121-26). The court heard 
oral argument on December 19, 2011, after which the District Court affirmed summary 
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judgment for the Defendants. 1 Plaintiff thereafter filed an Amended Notice of Appeal 
pursuant to I. R.A. 17 on January 3, 2012. (R. p. 132). 
C. Statement Of Facts. 
1. Plaintiff presented to the Portneuf Medical Center emergency 
department on April 23, 2009, complaining of headache. (R. p. 34). She was treated in the 
emergency room by Defendant Jeff Johnson, P.A., who after evaluating the patient and 
initially trying non-narcotic medications agreed to the Plaintiffs request that she be 
provided with a limited amount of narcotic pain medication. Plaintiff was given the names 
of local primary care physicians and told to set up care with a local provider. 
2. Plaintiff again presented to the Portneuf Medical Center emergency 
department on April 27, 2009, complaining of headache. (R. p. 34). At that time, the 
patient was seen by a different emergency room provider who documented that he was 
concerned the patient had presented to the emergency room exhibiting drug seeking 
behavior. 
3. Plaintiff again presented to the Portneuf Medical Center emergency 
department on May 12, 2009, with another subjective pain complaint of suffering from a 
headache. (R. p. 25-28). She was seen and treated in the emergency room by Jeff 
Johnson, P.A. The patient again requested to be treated with narcotic pain medication. Id. 
Plaintiff had failed to establish care with a primary care provider as previously instructed 
1 This Court granted the defense/respondent motion to augment the record on appeal to 
Include the District Court's February 27, 2012 decision denying Plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment 
under Rule 59(a). Counsel for Respondent is not clear how this document is being referred to on appeal as 
an augmented portion of the record. As a result, this decision is simply attached as Exhibit A to this response 
brief. 
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and was asked again to do so. Id. The patient was provided with a limited amount of 
narcotic pain medication and again instructed to establish care with a local provider rather 
than simply coming into the emergency room for such care. Id. at 27. 
4. Dr. Randall Fowler was the supervising physician on duty in the 
Portneuf emergency room during Plaintiff's May 12, 2009 visit. He did not examine or treat 
Plaintiff at that time, but he agreed with Johnson's emergency medical treatment and 
recommendations to the Plaintiff. See Aff. Randall Fowler, M.D. (R. p. 38). 
5. Plaintiff presented to the Portneuf Medical Center emergency 
department on June 5,2009, with another subjective pain complaint that she was suffering 
from a headache. (R. p. 29-33). At that time, she also reported radiating pain, nausea, 
chills, night sweats, dizziness and light sensitivity. (R. p. 31). She was seen, evaluated and 
treated in the emergency room by Defendant Jeff Johnson, P.A.ld. Because of the range 
of symptoms described by the patient, P.A. Johnson performed the required ER physical 
exam which included, among other things, auscultating the patient's heart and lungs. (R. 
p. 30). The patient requested narcotic pain medication after alleging that the non-narcotic 
pain medication administered by Johnson had not been effective at relieving her subjective 
pain complaints. Id. Although inconsistent with a migraine headache, the patient reported 
pain relief after receiving an intravenous injection of the narcotic drug morphine. Id. The 
patient was again provided a limited prescription for narcotic pain medication and 
instructed to establish a physician patient relationship with a local provider. rd. 
6. Dr. Kurtis Holt was the supervising physician on duty in the Portneuf 
emergency room during Plaintiff's June 5,2009 visit. He did not examine or treat Plaintiff 
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at that time, but he agreed with Johnson's emergency medical treatment and 
recommendations to the Plaintiff. (R. p. 44). 
7. On each occasion that Plaintiff was treated by Defendant Johnson, the 
patient made repeated requests for narcotic pain medication despite the fact that such 
medication is not generally effective at relieving migraine headache pain. Following the 
June 5, 2009 visit, the patient was refused a narcotic pain medication refill by the 
Defendants. (R. p. 21, para. 9). This is because ER's do not provide prescription refills 
which is one of the reasons why the patient was repeatedly told to establish care with a 
local primary care physician. 
8. Plaintiff subsequently presented to the Portneuf Medical Center 
emergency department on June 8,2009; July 6,2009; July 7,2009; July 21,2009; August 
19,2009; and September 10,2009 all with continuing subjective complaints of a headache 
and requesting further narcotic pain medication. (R. p. 34). It is unknown whether Plaintiff 
ever sought treatment from any other medical providers during the above time period. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in concluding that all of Plaintiff's claims arise out 
of the provision of medical care and are therefore exclusively governed by 
Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, specifically including the expert witness 
requirements of Idaho Code §6-1 012? 
2. Did the District Court err in concluding that the affidavit of Dr. Bowman, in 
which he fails to identify his medical specialty, fails to identify the physicians 
with whom he claims to have consulted and fails to discuss the relevant time 
period in describing his efforts to familiarize himself with the applicable 
standard of health care practice, lacks foundation and is therefore 
inadmissible? 
3. Does Idaho Code § 54-1814, which enumerates grounds for which a 
licensed physician or physicians' assistant may be subject to discipline by the 
Idaho State Board of Medicine, supercede Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act 
by creating a statewide standard of health care practice for all medical 
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providers, regardless oftime, location or medical specialty whenever a claim 
for malpractice is alleged? 
III. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Are Respondents entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 because of Appellant's 
failure to identify any misapplication of the law and/or abuse of discretion by 
the District Court? 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Appellate Court's 
standard of review is the same standard used by the District Court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,871,136 P.3d 338, 342 
(2006); see also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 225, 999 P.2d 877, 
880 (2000); see also First Sec. Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,790,964 P.2d 654, 657 
(1998). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law summary 
judgment is proper." Id. 
Summary judgment is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is the 
"principal tool ... by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and 
prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and 
private resources." Paugh v. Ottman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52281, *9-10 (D. Idaho 2008) 
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 377 (1986) (alterations in original)). In 
evaluating the sufficiency of the materials submitted in opposition to summary judgment, 
the Court must bear in mind the distinction between the requirements for admissibility of 
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expert opinion testimony under Rule 56(e) and the test for sufficiency of such testimony 
in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. The "admissibility of affidavits under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is a threshold question to be analyzed before applying 
the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rules required when reviewing motions 
for summary judgment." Edmunds at 871,136 P.3d 342. The Court must look at the 
affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts, which taken as 
true, would render the testimony admissible. Id. (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l 
Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160,163,45 P.3d 816,819 (2002)). 
In order to determine whether the trial court erred in the granting of summary 
judgment, it is first necessary to examine the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Edmunds, 
142 Idaho at 872, 136 P.3d 343. Furthermore, "when reviewing the trial court's evidentiary 
rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard." Id. "A district court's 
evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed by this Court, unless there has been a clear abuse 
of discretion." McDaniel v.lnland Northwest Renal Care Group -Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 
219, 222, 159 P.3d 856, 861 (2007). ''To determine whether the trial court has abused its 
discretion, we consider whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether 
it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
standards, and whether it reached its discretion by an exercise of reason." Shane v. Blair, 
139 Idaho 126, 128-129, 75 P.3d 180, 182-183 (2003) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. 
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993,1000 (1991)). See also Lamar 
Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999)). 
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V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Properly Concluded That Plaintiff's Claims Are 
Governed By Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act. 
Although not clearly set forth in her opening brief, Plaintiff's repeated 
defamatory representation of Respondent Johnson's efforts to auscultate her heart and 
lungs during his examination appears aimed at pursuing both a battery claim and a 
malpractice theory.2 Plaintiff cites to no authority to support a battery claim and 
Respondents contend that under the facts of this case no such claim is recognized against 
a health care provider under Idaho law. It is undisputed that the patient presented to the 
emergency department at Portneuf Regional Medical Center complaining of a range of 
symptoms, including headache, radiating pain, nausea, chills, night sweats, dizziness and 
light sensitivity. (R. p. 31). As part of the reasonable and necessary evaluation for this 
patient, Respondent Johnson conducted a physical examination which required him to 
auscultate the patient's heart and lungs with his stethoscope. This act, performed in the 
course and scope of providing medical care to evaluate the patient's condition, required 
Respondent Johnson to partially remove the patient's bra and place the stethoscope on 
the patient's chest in order to listen to her internal organs. 
It is well settled thatthe requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 
apply to "any case, claim or action for damages due to injury ... brought against any 
physician [,]. . physicians' assistant ... or any person vicariously liable for the negligence 
2 It is worth noting that in the complaint Plaintiff describes the conduct at issue as follows 
"Without consent Johnson then completely lifted Plaintiffs's bra up and over. exposing her left breast, looked 
under her gown and brushed his hand over her left nipple, then continued with the stethoscope while resting 
his hand on her left breast for approximately 15-20 seconds, while claiming to check her heartbeat." (R. p. 4). 
Yet, hoping to invoke some passion, throughout her brief she falsely describes Respondent Johnson as 
having "remov[ed] a patient's bra against her will, grabbing her breast, staring at it and hanging onto it for 15-
20 seconds .. " (See i.e. Plaintiffs opening brief dated May 22,2012 at p. 1,5,7,8,9, 12, 14). 
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of them ... on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care or on account 
of any matter incidental or related thereto. " See Idaho Code § 6-1012. Thus, any claim 
brought against a health care providerfor claims involving the provision of health care must 
be pled or will be deemed to have been pled as a claim for medical malpractice. See Litz 
v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282, 284, 955 P.2d 113, 115 (Idaho App. 1997); Hough v. Fry, 
131 Idaho 230,233,953 P.2d 980,983 (1998). 
A plaintiff "cannot avoid the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-
1013 by claiming his action is based on an intentional tort rather than negligence." Litz v. 
Robinson, 131 Idaho 282, 284, 955 P.2d 113, 115 (Ct. App. 1997). "The form of the 
action is not the decisive test in actions against physicians, surgeons and dentists for 
malpractice. The decisive test is the subject of the action." Id. at n.1. Accordingly, "to 
determine if I.C. § 6-1012 applies, courts need only look to see if the injury occurred on 
account of the provision of or failure to provide health care." Jones v. Crawforth, 147 
Idaho 11,16,205 P.3d 660,665 (2009) (quoting Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230,233,953 
P.2d 980, 983 (1998)) (emphasis in original). 
The case of Litz v. Robinson is representative of the Idaho appellate courts' 
response to a plaintiff's attempt at circumventing Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. In 
Litz, the plaintiff argued Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 did not apply to his claims 
because his cause of action was based on the intentional tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The Court of Appeals rejected that reasoning, noting that the 
"underlying nature of [the] claim ... was inextricably intertwined with a claim of 
negligence." 955 P.2d at 115 (citing to Trimming v. Howard, where this Court rejected a 
plaintiff's argument that his cause of action against a surgeon was grounded in contract, 
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reasoning that "the basic allegations of the complaint are directed solely to carelessness, 
negligence and misconduct as the proximate cause of the injury claimed to have been 
suffered." 52 Idaho 412, 415-16,16 P.2d 661,662 (1932)). Thus, the plaintiff was unable 
to avoid the statutory requirements applicable to a claim for medical negligence by "artfully 
labeling his cause of action as a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress." 
Id. 
Another decision addressing this issue can be found in the case of Hough 
v. Fry. In Hough, the plaintiff argued her cause of action was not governed by I.C. §§ 6-
1012 and 6-1013, arguing instead that it was a claim for injuries resulting from the "ordinary 
negligence" of her therapist in failing to support her while she was on a balance board. 
Hough, 131 Idaho at 233,953 P.2d at 983. This Court rejected that argument, stating: 
"[t]here is nothing in the statute or its statement 
of purpose to indicate that the type of 
negligence, ordinary or professional, has 
anything to do with the application of Section 6-
1012. Rather, by its plain and unambiguous 
language, the statute applies when the 
damages complained of result from providing 
or failing to provide health care." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
As the District Court in this case correctly pointed out, the Plaintiff alleges that 
a battery "took place during and in connection with the provision of medical 
treatment-listening to a heartbeat with a stethoscope. Surely these alleged acts fall under 
the purview of 6-1012, especially in light of the language [in that statute] including 'any 
matter incidental or related to the provision of medical care.'" (Ex. A, p.7]). The District 
Court correctly noted that "the Idaho appellate courts disfavor allowing plaintiffs to escape 
the requirements of 6-1012 and 6-1013 by 'artfully' labeling their causes of action as 
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something other than medical malpractice when the alleged actions are connected to and 
intertwined with the provision of medical care." (Ex. A, p. 8). In the absence of any 
authority to the contrary, the District Court properly treated all her claims, including claims 
for intentional torts, as but one claim for medical malpractice. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Concluded Dr. 
Bowman's Affidavit Failed To Comply With The Admissibility 
Requirements Of Rule 56(e) And Idaho Code § 6-1013. 
To be admissible, an affidavit opposing summary judgement must "set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." I.R.C.P. 56(e). The question of 
admissibility of affidavits under Rule 56(e) is a "threshold question to be analyzed before 
applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rules when reviewing motions 
for summary judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P .2d 1224, 1227 
(1994). 
"Admissibility of expert testimony requires personal knowledge." Shane v. 
Blair, 139 Idaho 126,129,75 P.3d 180,183 (2003). It is well settled that experts testifying 
as to the standard of practice in medical malpractice actions must show that they have 
familiarized themselves with the standard: 1) for the relevant community; 2) for the relevant 
time; and, 3) for a particular profession. Arregui v. Gal/egos-Main, Docket 38496 (Idaho 
May 4,2012); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37, 156 P.3d 533, 538 (2007); Perry v. 
Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51,995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000); Kolin v. St. 
Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,331,940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997). Idaho Code 
§ 6-1012 defines the relevant community and "is both site and time specific." 156 P.3d at 
538 (quoting Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294, 296, 815 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1991 )). "[Idaho 
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Code] Section 6-1013 requires actual knowledge of the standard of care in the community 
where the alleged malpractice occurred." Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138,146,937 
P.2d 1212, 1220 (1997). "They must also state how they became familiar with the 
standard of care for the particular professional." Perry, 134 at 51, 995 P .2d at 821 (citing 
Kolin v. Sf. Luke's Reg 'I Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,331,940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997») 
(emphasis added). As outlined herein and as properly concluded by the District Court, the 
affidavit of Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Bowman, fails to comply with the foregoing requirements. 
1. As an of-of-area physician, Dr. Bowman has not set forth facts 
showing he is familiar with the location and time specific 
requirements regarding the standard of health care practice 
applicable to each of the Defendant health care providers. 
Dr. Bowman is not a Pocatello physician, nor is there any evidence in his 
affidavit that he is an emergency room physiCian or an emergency room physicians' 
assistant. Thus, in order for Dr. Bowman's opinions against the Respondents to be 
admissible for purposes of opposing the defense motion for summary judgment, he was 
required to demonstrate-by setting forth "facts as would be admissible in evidence," that 
he had taken affirmative steps in order to acquire actual knowledge of the Pocatello 
standard of health care practice applicable to each of the Respondents. See Rule 56(e) 
and Idaho Code § 6-1013(1 )(c). 
In an attempt to comply with these requirements, Dr. Bowman states in his 
affidavit that he spoke with two secret consultant physicians from Pocatello regarding the 
allegations in the Complaint. (R p. 73). Of these secret consultants, one purportedly had 
emergency room privileges in Pocatello in the past while the other purportedly had current 
emergency room privileges in Pocatello. (R. p. 72-3 at para 6(a) and (c). There is no 
reference to whether these unknown consultants ever had actual knowledge of the 
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applicable standard of practice for 2009 for each of the Defendants in order to be able to 
convey such information to Dr. Bowman. Throughout his affidavit, Dr. Bowman never 
states that the secret consultant doctor(s) ever told him they were familiar with the standard 
applicable to the Defendants for the 2009 time frame. 
One of the anonymous doctors purportedly "had emergency room privileges 
in Pocatello," but there is no indication of when he purportedly had such privileges 
(perhaps many years before or since the relevant time period). (R. p. 72). Likewise, the 
other anonymous physician purportedly "has privileges to practice emergency medicine in 
Pocatello," but there is no indication of when he acquired such privileges (perhaps years 
afterthe relevant time period). (R. p. 73). Again, these deficiencies render Dr. Bowman's 
affidavit inadmissible due to a lack of foundation. Thus, Dr. Bowman's affidavit fails to 
create an issue of fact because it does not set forth any "facts as would be admissible in 
evidence." 
This Court has previously ruled that no uniform standard of health care 
practice can be assumed within the state of Idaho. Ramos, 144 Idaho at 38,156 P.3d at 
539. In fact, this Court has previously addressed the very question of whether the 
applicable standard of health care practice is the same for Pocatello and Idaho Falls, and 
found that it is not. See Gublerv. Boe, 120 Idaho 294,815 P.2d 1034, (1991) (upholding 
the trial court's decision to exclude plaintiffs expert witness testimony where the expert had 
not familiarized himself with the community standard of health care practice in Pocatello, 
as he had spoken only with a doctor practicing in Idaho Falls). Accordingly, Dr. Bowman 
was required to show how he became familiar with the relevant standard as it existed in 
Pocatello in 2009. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 14 
Plaintiff mis-states the relevant time period requirement of Idaho Code §6-
1012 examined and explained by this Court in Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Reg 'I Med. Gtr., 
137 Idaho 160,45 P.3d 816 (2002). In Dulaney, the Court outlined remarkably similar 
foundational deficiencies which it held rendered a plaintiff's expert affidavit inadmissible 
for purposes of opposing a defense motion for summary judgment. There the Court noted: 
Even assuming that the use of an anonymous 
informant is an acceptable manner for 
adequately familiarizing an out-of-area physician 
of the local standard of care, Dr. Stump's 
affidavit does not allege specific facts showing 
that the anonymous professor was familiar with 
the standard of care for orthopedic surgeons in 
Boise in 1994. The professor stated that he had 
trained orthopedic physicians "that presently 
practice in Boise," but he did not state whether 
they were practicing in Boise in 1994. He stated 
that he has "maintained personal and 
professional relationships with physicians in 
Boise," but he did not state whether he did so 
during 1994. He likewise did not state that he 
had ever discussed with these orthopedic 
physicians the standard of care for an orthopedic 
physician practicing in Boise in 1994. He stated 
that he had taught and lectured in Boise, but did 
not state when he did so. Dr. Stump's affidavit 
does not allege any specific facts showing that 
the anonymous professor was familiar with the 
standard of care for orthopedic surgeons in 
Boise in August 1994. The professor's 
conclusory statement that he was familiar with 
the standard of care in Boise in 1994 is simply 
not sufficient. 
Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 169, 45 P.3d at 825. 
Plaintiff reiterates that "Dr. Bowman repeats over and over, nine times, that 
the specific timeframe of conduct he refers to is May and June of 2009." Appellant's Brief 
p. 12. That argument misses the point. The deficiency that the District Court held 
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rendered Dr. Bowman's affidavit inadmissible did not turn on whether he had properly 
identified the time period of the alleged misconduct. The issue is whether his affidavit 
demonstrates an adequate foundation for the conclusion that he has actual knowledge of 
the applicable local standard of practice in 2009. The defense contends that Dr. Bowman's 
affidavit fails to do so and was properly ruled inadmissible by the District Court. 3 
2. Dr. Bowman has not demonstrated that he is familiar with the 
standard of health care practice applicable to each of the 
Respondents' class of health care provider. 
While it is clear from his affidavit that Dr. Bowman is an out-of-area physician, 
it is equally unclear from his affidavit what sort of physician Dr. Bowman is. For example, 
it is unknown from the face of his affidavit if he is a podiatrist, dermatologist, oncologist, 
etc. 4 Presumably he is not an emergency room physician or else he would have simply 
stated such in his affidavit.5 This creates additional foundational problems as it relates to 
the court's ability to address the sufficiency of Dr. Bowman's affidavit. (R. p. 71-75). 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 "makes clear that a health care provider must be 
compared to a health care provider with similar training and in the same category or class, 
'taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields of medical specialization.'" 
3 As this Court pointed out in its recent medical malpractice decision in Arregui v. Gal/egos-
Main. although the affidavit in Dulaney "provided much more detail and facts regarding the anonymous 
professor's knowledge and experience; nevertheless, the Court still found the affidavit lacked foundation 
because it did not relate the professor's experience to the time period in question." Docket No. 38496. slip op. 
at 27 (Idaho May 4,2012). Dr. Bowman's affidavit suffers from each and every deficiency the Dulaney Court 
found in the Stump affidavit Accordingly. the Bowman affidavit is equally inadmissible 
4 According to the Idaho State Board of Medicine. Dr. Bowman is a doctor of osteopathy with 
a specialty in family medicine working at a skin clinic in Idaho Falls. There is no reference to him being in any 
way affiliated with emergency medicine. See https/lisecure.bom.idaho.gov/BOMPublic/ 
LicensePublicRecord.aspx?Board=BOM&LicenseType=O&LicenseN0=175. Last accessed on July 11,2012. 
51t arguably was the duty of Plaintiffs counsel to assist Dr. Bowman in avoiding these most 
basic errors. As this Court has stated, a[t]he attorney must be involved in advising the expert as to how to 
learn the applicable standard of care and determining whether the expert has done so." Ramos v. Dixon, 
144 Idaho 32,37, 156 P3d 533,538 (2007). 
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Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,905,935 P.2d 165,168 (1997) (quoting I.R.C.P. § 6-
1012). This Court has clearly stated that it cannot be assumed that the standard of health 
care practice is the same for physicians of different specialties, even where the procedure 
at issue is relatively simple. See Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110,121,254 P.3d 
11, 22 (2011) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that there is a "statewide mandate in every 
profession requiring an adequate patient history");6 see also Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus 
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163,45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002) (finding that an expert 
neurologist's testimony was properly excluded where there were no facts in the record 
showing the standards for a neurologist was the same as for the defendant emergency 
room physician or orthopedic surgeon). 
Consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1 012 and 6-1013 as set 
forth in Dulaney, a[t]he witness must demonstrate a knowledge acquired from experience 
or study of the standards of the specialty of the defendant physician sufficient to enable 
him to give an expert opinion as to the conformity of the defendant's conduct to those 
particular standards ... " Id. at 824. Accordingly, Dr. Bowman was required to show how 
he became familiar with the standard of health care practice applicable to the 
Respondents' particular professions. As an out-of-town physician of an unknown specialty, 
Plaintiff was required to have Dr. Bowman explain in his affidavit how he is qualified to 
render opinions against each of the Defendants. 
Turning to his affidavit, Dr. Bowman again relies totally on having: 1) 
"previously hired a doctor from Pocatello to work for me, and he had emergency room 
6 Appellant misreads the facts of the Suhadolnik case which is one of defense counsel's 
cases It did not concern the requirements for an expert to testify concerning the details of a cataract surgery; 
rather. it concerned. in part. the taking of an "adequate patient history." Suhadolnik v. Pressman. 151 Idaho 
110.121.254 P3d 11.22 (2011). 
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privileges in Pocatello" (R. p. 72); 2) "evaluated the emergency room at Portneuf Medical 
Center" (R. p. 73); and, 3) "personally spoke with another medical doctor in Pocatello who 
also has privileges to practice emergency medicine in Pocatello." (R. p. 73). The District 
Court properly concluded this showing was inadequate as nothing in the record 
demonstrates that Dr. Bowman would have "knowledge acquired from experience or study 
of the standards" applicable to a physicians' assistant or to a physician specializing in 
emergency medicine. 
Dr. Bowman's affidavit does not identify the doctor whom he claims to have 
hired to work for him, nor does he identify that doctor's medical specialty. Similarly, Dr. 
Bowman fails to identify the other medical doctor in Pocatello with whom he spoke or how 
and when it is was that this secret consultant "has privileges to practice emergency 
medicine in Pocatello." (R. p. 73). As a result, the Court cannot glean from Dr. Bowman's 
vague references to anonymous physicians whether they have actual knowledge of the 
standard of health care practice applicable to the Respondents for the pertinent time period 
of May and June. 2009. As phrased by the Dulaney Court, "[t]here are no facts showing" 
the anonymous familiarizing physicians "had actual knowledge of the standard of care for 
those medical specialties."Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 168, 45 P.3d at 824. There is nothing in 
Dr. Bowman's affidavit that demonstrates he has any familiarity with the Respondents' 
particular professions, which again renders his affidavit lacking in foundation and therefore 
inadmissible. 
3. Respondent Johnson can only be judged in comparison with the 
standard of health care practice applicable to a physician 
assistant. 
Dr. Bowman's affidavit demonstrates that he does not recognize there is a 
distinction between the standards applicable to a physician versus those applicable to a 
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physicians' assistant. Dr. Bowman consistently lumps together the standards for 
physicians and physicians' assistants by stating: "I am familiar with the standard of care 
of physicians practicing in Pocatello, Idaho, and know first-hand the applicable standard 
of care for physicians and physicians' assistants . .. " (R. p. 72) (emphasis added); " . 
. . as such standard then and there existed with respect to physicians and physicians' 
assistants operating or functioning in Jeff Johnson's capacity" (R. p. 72) (emphasis 
added); ". . it is my opinion that the treatment given by Jeff Johnson to Heather Hall, as 
described in paragraph 15 of her complaint, on June 5, 2009, failed to meet the standard 
of care of physicians and physicians' assistants . ... " (R. p. 74) (emphasis added). As 
a physician and not a physicians' assistant, Dr. Bowman was required (even with the 
assistance of Plaintiff's counsel) to take affirmative steps to educate himself about the 
standards applicable to physicians' assistants working in the emergency room in Pocatello 
in 2009. There is nothing in Dr. Bowman's affidavit that demonstrates he has made any 
attempt to do so, which again renders his affidavit lacking in foundation and therefore 
inadmissible. 
Plaintiff cannot overlook the fact there is a difference between a physician, 
i.e. Dr. Bowman, and a physicians' assistant, i.e. Respondent Johnson, which is expressly 
recognized by statute. For purposes of establishing a cause of action for malpractice in 
Idaho, the focus is not the type of medical procedure performed, but rather the type of 
health care provider performing it. Idaho Code §6-1 012. The Plaintiff therefore cannot get 
around the foundational deficiencies in Dr. Bowman's affidavit by artfully arguing that "[t]he 
medical procedure in this case is so basic it is universally delegated to assistants." 
Appellant's Brief p. 12. 
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In Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,935 P.2d 165 (1997), a plaintiff in a 
medical malpractice case argued that in the context of prescribing medication that an 
optometrist should be held to the same standard as an ophthalmologist since both are 
licensed to prescribe medication. Griswold, 129 Idaho at 905,935 P.2d at 168. This Court 
disagreed, noting that such an argument "ignores the requirements of I.C. Sections 6-1 012 
and 6-1013." Id. The Court went on to explain that "an ophthalmologist is a medical 
practitioner of a different class than an optometrist," meaning they cannot be held to the 
same standard. Id. As a result, summary judgment for the defendant health care provider 
was affirmed 
Similarly, in Dulaney, this Court determined a plaintiff's neurology expert was 
not competent to testify, because he had not familiarized himself with the standard of 
practice applicable to the defendants' medical specialties of emergency care and 
orthopedic surgery. The Court commented that "with respect to the care at issue, the local 
standard for a neurologist [might be] the same as that for an emergency room physician 
or orthopedic surgeon." Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 168, 45 P.3d at 824. However, the Court 
found the expert failed to demonstrate such by showing he had "actual knowledge of the 
applicable standard of care for emergency room physicians or orthopedic surgeons." Id. 
Thus, the expert was not qualified to testify.? 
As demonstrated by the optometrist and ophthalmologist at issue in 
Griswold, it may be common for physicians of a different class, with different "training, 
experience, and fields of medical specialization," to perform the same procedure. Idaho 
Code § 6-1012. This does not mean, however, that they are to be held to the same 
The expert in Dulaney was not disqualified simply because his was of a different 
medical specialty from the defendant health care provider, but rather because he had not familiarized 
himself with the standard applicable to the defendant's medical specialty. 
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standard of health care practice-in fact, doing so is forbidden by statute in Idaho. Plaintiff 
contends that because the malpractice at issue did not involve a "technical medical 
procedure requiring board certification," that "any licensed physician in Idaho" should be 
deemed qualified to testify against Respondent Johnson and his treatment of the patient. 
Appellant's Brief p. 11. Plaintiff cites to no case authority to support such a proposition, 
which is squarely in conflict with the express language of Idaho Code §6-1012. The 
Griswold and Dulaney cases outlined above solidify the conclusion that it is the defendant 
health care provider's medical specialty that determines the applicable standard, not the 
procedure in question. While it is true that physicians, physicians' assistants, registered 
nurses, and nurse practitioners are all capable of auscultating a patient's heart and lungs, 
they all, however, have different "training, experience, and fields of medical specialty" and 
therefore, under Idaho Code § 6-1012, are held to different standards. 
Indeed, a simple example would be that of a cardiologist who specializes in 
heart medicine who would have vastly different training and experience in auscultation of 
a patient's heart and lungs than would a family physician or a dermatologist. It was 
precisely because of these differences that the statutory language was employed to 
insulate health care providers from being held to an unfair standard of practice. Without 
such statutory language, one could easily see scenarios wherein patients would seek to 
use health care providers with more specialized training to testify against lesser qualified 
or experienced providers. 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 specifically lists "physicians' assistant" among the 
classes of health care providers to which the Act applies. As such, Respondent Johnson 
must be judged "in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same 
class in the same community." Idaho Code § 6-1012 (emphasis added). To comply with 
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this requirement and to establish an issue of fact, Plaintiff's affidavit from Dr. Bowmen was 
required to set forth how he acquired personal knowledge of the standard of practice 
applicable to a physicians' assistant like Respondent Johnson. Without such an 
explanation, his affidavit was properly excluded by the District Court based on a lack of 
foundation.s 
In addition, the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment to all the 
Defendants, on .ill! of the claims, was proper since "[t]he other claims in the complaint 
against Johnson's supervising physicians and Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians, 
L. L.C are derived from the claims against Johnson." (R. p. 107). Therefore, because 
Plaintiff provided no admissible expert opinion that Respondent Johnson had committed 
any malpractice, the derivative malpractice claims against the other Respondents (who had 
no direct contact with the patient) also fail. 
C. The District Court Properly Concluded That Idaho Code § 54-1814 Does 
Not Establish A Statewide Standard of Practice Applicable To The 
Health Care At Issue In This Case. 
Plaintiff argues that her allegations of "groping" required the Defendants to 
address in their affidavits this specific conduct and to address the alleged statewide 
standard established per Idaho Code § 54-1814. Appellant's Brief p. 12. This argument 
is without merit as it confuses the respective burdens placed on the moving and non-
moving parties. It is well settled that at the summary judgment phase, the moving party is 
required only to point out the "absence of evidence" to support the non-moving party's 
case. Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 893, 120 P.3d 278, 281 (2005). At that point it is 
8 The District Court found that "all these deficiencies, collectively and individually, render Dr. 
Bowman's affidavit inadmissible under I.RCP. 56(e) and IC. §§ 6-1012 and 1013" (R P 107) (emphasis 
added) 
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the non-moving party's burden to "come forward with evidence, and to 'set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" [d. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(e) (internal 
cites omitted). The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of that party's pleadings." I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
The Defendant health care providers did, to the extent required of them, 
address the specific conduct at issue, because that "conduct" was the provision of medical 
care. Jeff Johnson, P.A., Dr. Holt and Dr. Fowler each filed Affidavits which set forth their 
actual knowledge of the local standard of health care practice applicable to emergency 
medical providers in Pocatello, Idaho in 2009. (R. p. 19-47). Those affidavits further stated 
that the care and treatment they provided complied in all respects with the applicable local 
community standard of health care practice for Pocatello, Idaho, in 2009. Id. Accordingly, 
said Affidavits established the elements required by Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 1013, as 
well as Rule 56(e) and were sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the Plaintiff to respond. 
Thus, the burden was shifted "to the non-moving party to produce evidence 
sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor." Foster, 120 P.3d at 281. The Plaintiff "may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleadings." I.R.C.P. 56(e). If the 
evidence put forth by the non-moving party is in the form of an affidavit, the affidavit "must 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein" and 
"shall be made on personal knowledge." Id. The question of admissibility of affidavits 
under Rule 56(e) is a "threshold question to be analyzed before applying the liberal 
construction and reasonable inferences rules when reviewing motions for summary 
judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). 
With the above principles in mind, it is clear that Dr. Bowman's affidavit does 
not rise to the task of creating a genuine issue of material fact, because his "opinions" are 
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nothing more than a restatement of the allegations in the pleadings, and are not based on 
the affiant's personal knowledge. Dr. Bowman's affidavit states that his opinions are based 
on the medical records and the Complaint filed in this case. (R. p. 74). With respect to the 
allegations in the Complaint, Dr. Bowman states that "the treatment given by Jeff Johnson 
to Heather Hall, as described in paragraph 15 of her complaint" violated "the standard of 
care expected of any health care provider in Pocatello, whether in an emergency room or 
otherwise." Id. (emphasis added). Such a statement fails to satisfy the requirements of 
Rule 56(e). 
To the extent Dr. Bowman wants to base his opinions on the allegations in 
the Complaint, the allegations are simply that, allegations; they are not facts in evidence. 
It is well settled in the summary judgment setting that a Plaintiff may not rely merely upon 
the allegations in her complaint, but rather she must set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence in order to create an issue of fact. Rule 56(e): Suhadolnik v. 
Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 254 P.3d 11 (2011). That requirement is not satisfied when 
the Plaintiff simply re-states her allegations by proxy, as she has done here through Dr. 
Bowman's affidavit. Dr. Bowman has done nothing to affirmatively show he has personal 
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint, such that he would be competent to testify 
with regard to those allegations. 
For example, there is no evidence that Dr. Bowman ever read the Affidavit 
of Heather Hall, that he ever spoke to Heather Hall or that he ever even read the defense 
affidavits. Rather, his opinions are consistently qualified by phrases such as "as described 
in paragraph 15 of her complaint" and "if Heather Hall's report of what occurred on June 
5,2009, is accurate." (R. pp. 74, 75). Such phrases demonstrate that Dr. Bowman has no 
personal knowledge regarding whether the allegations are true, or not Therefore, his 
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opinions necessarily are conclusory, speculative and not based on personal knowledge of 
the affiant As such, they are inadmissible under I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Likewise, Dr. Bowman's statement that his opinions are based in any way on 
his review of the medical records is of no support. The medical records of Heather Hall do 
not address, nor do they in any way support the allegations set forth in her Complaint (see 
R. pp. 25-35). The medical records describe the encounters Respondent Johnson had 
with the patient on the dates in question. Id. In his affidavit, Dr. Bowman does not point 
to anything in the medical records that supports his opinions or his conclusions that there 
were any failures or violations of the standards of practice by any of the Respondents. Dr. 
Bowman was required to state with particularity what each Respondent did that amounted 
to a violation of the applicable standard of practice. His failure to do so renders his affidavit 
insufficient to establish an issue of fact. 
Furthermore, the legislative intent, language and requirements of Idaho Code 
§ 54-1801 et seq. are not compatible with the requirements for maintaining a medical 
malpractice action as set forth in Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. "It is well established 
that statutes should be interpreted to mean what the legislature intended them to mean." 
Walker v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. of Idaho, 102 Idaho 266, 268, 629 P.2d 662, 664 
(1981). The stated purpose of Idaho's "Medical Practice Act" (I.C. § 54-1801 et seq) is "to 
assure the public health, safety and welfare in the state by the licensure and regulation of 
physicians, and the exclusion of unlicensed persons from the practice of medicine." Idaho 
Code § 54-1801 (emphasis added). To further the purpose of that Act, § 54-1814 provides 
"Grounds for Medical Discipline," whereby those licensed to practice medicine in Idaho 
may be "subject to discipline by the board pursuant to the procedures set forth in [Chapter 
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18] and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto." Idaho Code § 54-1814 (emphasis 
added). 
Plaintiff provides no authority to support the proposition that the provisions 
of Idaho's Medical Practice Act have any application in the context of a civil action seeking 
damages based on allegations of medical malpractice. Defendants contend this is 
because no such authority exists as the Idaho legislature never intended the Medical 
Practice Act to apply in civil actions like the case at bar. Rather, the legislature enacted 
Idaho Code § 6-1001 et seq, Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, to apply in "any case, claim 
or action for damages" brought against a health care provider in Idaho. Idaho Code § 6-
1012. 
Unlike the requirements set forth under Idaho Code § 54-1814, Idaho Code 
§ 6-1012 requires "direct expert testimony" that the defendant physician failed to meet the 
applicable standard of health care practice of the local community. Strode v. Lenzi, 116 
Idaho 214,775 P.2d 106 (1989); Dekkerv. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115 
Idaho 332,766 P.2d 1213 (1988); Kunz v. Miciak, 118 Idaho 130, 795 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 
1990); Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164,45 P.3d 
816 (2002); Fosterv. Traul, 141 Idaho 890,120 P.3d 278 (2005); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 
Idaho 32, 156 P.3d 533 (2007) see also McDaniel v.lnland Northwest Renal Care, 144 
Idaho 219, 159 P.3d 856 (2007) "[T]o allow plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits to 
establish that a provider has breached the standard of care indirectly by showing that he 
or she breached a statute or rule flies in the face of the legislature's intent that plaintiffs 
prove that the provider breached the standard of care through direct testimony." 
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176,183,219 P.3d 1192, 1199 (2009). 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 26 
As discussed in Section A, above, Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, by its 
very terms, applies to "any case, claim or action for damages" brought against a health 
care provider in Idaho. Idaho Code § 6-1012. Whereas, Idaho Code § 54-1814, by its 
very terms, applies to "discipline by the board." It is worth noting that Idaho Code § 54-
1814(7) contains language "similar to the well-accepted definition of medical malpractice," 
yet, one statute provides a rubric under which medical malpractice claims for damages are 
considered, and the other provides that the Idaho State Board of Medicine may initiate 
disciplinary procedures when it determines that malpractice has occurred. Haw v. Idaho 
st. Bd. Of Med., 140 Idaho 152, 158, 90 P.3d 902, 908 (2004). The two statutes do not 
overlap in their application, because the statutes have different purposes and different 
requirements. 
Some of the problems associated with plaintiffs' intermingling of rules and 
statutes were highlighted in the case of Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 183,219 P.3d 
1192, 1199 (2009). There, the appellants argued that the District Court abused its 
discretion in not permitting their undisclosed expert witness to testify that the defendants' 
failure to abide by the terms of a Delegation of Services (DOS) Agreement (as required by 
IDAPA § 22.01.03.030.04) constituted a breach of the standard of care in their medical 
malpractice claim. In upholding the District Court's decision to exclude the expert 
testimony, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the testimony would not have saved the 
appellants' case even if it had been allowed. The Court pointed out that the specificity 
required by Idaho Code § 6-1012 regarding the applicable local standard of health care 
practice was in contrast to the generality of DOS agreements. The Court also noted that 
Idaho Code § 6-1013 requires a plaintiff's expert to testify to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that a breach of the standard of practice occurred, not that a breach of 
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a DOS agreement occurred. As such, to permit a plaintiff to establish a breach of the 
standard of practice via testimony regarding breach of a DOS agreement would "fl[y] in the 
face of the legislature's intent." Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 183, 219 P.3d at 1199. 
Appellant has not produced any medical evidence suggesting that 
Respondent Johnson had no medical purpose associated with his actions in touching the 
patient or being in proximity to her breast. The fact the patient contends after her 
examination that subjectively she felt the touching was offensive or unnecessary is 
irrelevant Indeed, many medical examinations and procedures can be extremely offensive 
or even demeaning to the average lay person, alia mammograms, prostate exams or 
colonoscopyexams. This does not mean the subjective beliefs of the patient rule the day 
in a malpractice case. 
Rather, the issue is whether the procedure was medically necessary and 
whether the manner in which it was performed was consistent with the applicable 
standards of practice for the health care provider at issue. 9 Touching one's "private parts" 
as part of rendering required emergency medical care in an emergency room in Idaho does 
not equate to "conduct which constitutes an abuse or exploitation of a patient" under Idaho 
Code § 54-1814(22). To even establish such a ground in disciplinary proceeding, the 
Idaho Board of Medicine would still be required to present qualified expert testimony that 
such conduct did, if fact, meet the elements of the statute. 
Simply stating a patient's subjective belief that she was improperly touched 
and then referring to a statute that provides for discipline for health care providers who 
9 It should be noted that Plaintiff has not pled a claim based on lack of informed consent for 
any of the care at issue. Lack of informed consent is an entirely separate and distinct claim from a medical 
malpractice claim. See Idaho Code § 39-4506, et seq. 
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engage in abuse or exploitation of a patient does not create a statewide minimum standard 
of practice for auscultating one's heart and lungs. In order to overcome a defense motion 
for summary judgment a patient is still required per Idaho Code § 6-1012 to present expert 
testimony demonstrating that the conduct in question violated the local standard of health 
care practice in the absence of an unequivocal minimum statewide standard which has not 
been demonstrated in this case. Since no such minimum standard exists in this case, nor 
was one ever advocated by Plaintiff's expert Dr. Bowman, it does not serve to create an 
issue of fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment. This was part and parcel of the 
District Court's decision which should be affirmed in all respects. 
Plaintiff's argument that § 54-1814(22) creates a statewide standard for 
performing a medical examination is analogous to the argument rejected by this Court in 
McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho. 144 Idaho 219, 159 P.3d 856 
(2007). There, the appellant argued that 42 C.F.R. § 405 Subpart U (which "prescribe[s] 
the role which End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) networks have in the ESRD program . 
. . and describe the health and safety requirements that facilities furnishing ESRD care to 
beneficiaries must meet") created a "minimum national standard of care with respect to 
services provided by ESRD dialysis facilities." Id. 144 Idaho 222-23, 159 P.3d at 859-60. 
10 Respondents agree with Plaintiff that Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. etr., 134 Idaho 
46. 51. 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000), "stands for the rule that if the expert testifies a national standard applies. 
and can demonstrate that, it is not even necessary to consult a local physician." Appellant's Brief p. 10 
(emphasis added). However, Perry concerned only the narrow question of whether it is possible to 
demonstrate that a national standard applies by reviewing the deposition of a local practitioner, rather than 
consulting with a local practitioner. This Court found that it is possible to make such a demonstration where 
the expert is familiar with the national standard and reviews the deposition of one familiar with both the 
national and local standard. whose deposition testimony also states that the two are not different The 
reasoning In Perry has no bearing here. however, where Dr Bowman did not review any deposition testimony. 
In fact there is no deposition testimony to review. as no party has taken any depositions 
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In rejecting that argument, this Court noted "a marked difference between 
regulations that govern the physical administration of health care services and those that 
govern other aspects of a health care provider's practice." Id. 144 Idaho at 223, 159 P.3d 
at 860. This Court went on to state that "[w]here the promulgated regulations do not 
concern the administration of health care services ... Idaho Code § 6-1012 dictates that 
the applicable standard of health care is that practiced in 'the community in which such 
care allegedly was or should have been provided.'" Id. Thus, the local community standard 
applied." 
It states: 
D. Respondents Are Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal Pursuant 
To Idaho Code § 12-121 And I.A.R. 41(a). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) governs the award of attorney fees. 
In any civil action the court may award 
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion 
of the court may include paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 
54(d)(1 )(B), when provided for by any statute or 
contract Provided, attorney fees under section 
12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the 
court only when it finds, from the facts presented 
to it, that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be 
awarded pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho 
Code, on a default judgment. 
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) 'creates no substantive right to attorney fees, but 
merely establishes a framework for applying I.C. § 12-121.'" Newberry v. Martens, 142 
11 Plaintiff would do just as well to cite the Idaho Criminal Code, which provides a "statewide 
standard" prohibiting battery. Neither "standard" supercedes the local community standard of proof required 
in Idaho Code § 6-1012 in a malpractice claim seeking money damages. 
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Idaho 284,292, 127 P.2d 187,195 (2005) (citing Huffv. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274,277 n.1, 647 
P.2d 730, 733 n.1 (1982)). 
According to the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate under 
that statute [Idaho Code § 12-121] only if this 
Court is left with the abiding belief that the 
appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation. Where 
an appeal turns on the question of law, an 
award of attorney fees under this section is 
proper if the law is well settled and the 
appellant has made no substantial showing 
that the district court misapplied the law. 
Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001). (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). 
Respondents contend that the case authority interpreting Rule 56(e) and 
Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 specifically discuss the steps an out-of-area expert 
must take in order to sufficiently familiarize himself or herself with the local standard of 
practice. The actions of Dr. Bowman, relying solely on anonymous physicians in order to 
familiarize himself without reference to medical specialty or time frame, resulted in a 
foundationally defective affidavit despite the presence of well-established Idaho case 
authorities regarding summary judgment in medical malpractice cases. Respondents 
further contend that Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and interpreting case authority 
firmly establish that Plaintiff's claims, and the applicable standard of health care practice, 
are governed exclusively by Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act. 
Based on the record before the Court, Respondents contend Appellant has 
unreasonably pursued this appeal and has failed to establish a credible misapplication of 
the law by the District Court. In light of the substantial expenses incurred as a result of this 
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undertaking, Respondents respectfully request that they be awarded attorney fees on 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41(a). 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly concluded that Dr. Bowman's affidavit failed to 
comply with the threshold foundational requirements set forth under Rule 56(e). Dr. 
Bowman is an out-of-area physician His affidavit states he relied upon anonymous 
physicians to learn about the local standard of practice. There is no evidence the 
anonymous physicians were familiar with the standard of health care practice for the 
relevant time period, which the District Court properly concluded prevented Dr. Bowman's 
affidavit from being admissible. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion 
and properly granted the Respondents' motion for summary judgment. The Respondents 
therefore respectfully request this Court affirm the District Court's decision in all respects 
and that the Respondents be awarded costs and attorney fees for defending against this 
appeal. 
DATED this 19th day of July, 2012. 
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CAREY PERKINS LLP 
Terrence S. Jones, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, BANNOCK COUNTY 
BEA TUER HALL, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN EMERGENCY 
PHYSICIANS, L.L.C., and KlJRTIS 
HOLT, M.D., and RANDALL FOWLER, 
M.D., and JEFF .JOHNSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-2011-1740-PI 
DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO ALTER OR AMEl\D JUDGMENT 
UNDER RULE 59(a) 
(MOTION TO RECONSIDER) 
Hon. David C. Nye 
This matter came before the COUJi for a hearing on Plaintiff Heather Hall's Motion on 
January 23, 2012. Allen Browning appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Heather Hall, and Tracy 
Wright appeared in behalf of all Defendants. At the hearing, the Court took Hall's motion under 
advisement, and now issues its decision, denying the motion. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case arises out of Hall's visits to the Portncuf Medical Center ("PMC") emerg":I1ey 
room in Pocatello to receive treatment for headaches. She alleges that on one occasion, a 
physician's assistant, .lefT Johnson, in the course of a medical examination, touched her breast 
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Exhibit A 
inappropriately while listening to her heartbeat with a stethoscope. She brought claims against 
Johnson for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. She also 
asserted claims against Drs. Kurtis Holt and Randall Fowler for negligent supervision of 
Johnson. Additionally, Hall asserted a claim against Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians, 
L.L.c., under the theory of respondeat superior. Defendants did not submit an answer to Hall's 
complaint, but moved for summary judgment in August 2011. On October 25,2011, the Court 
granted summary judgment to Defendants on all of Hall's claims against them, and entered 
judgment on November 1,2011. 
On November 10, 2011, Hall filed a document entitled "Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Under Rule 59(a)." Hall's Memorandum in Support was 
filed alone-unaccompanied by a separate document containing an actuaJ motion. At the January 
bearing. Hall requested that the Court consider her Memorandum as a motion as well. The basic 
substance of Hall's Memorandum is a request that the Court reconsider its summary judgment 
decision. However, the Court noted at the January hearing that Rule 59(a) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure pertains only to a motion for a new trial, so Hall also requested at the hearing 
that the Court consider her Memorandum a motion to reconsider brought under Rule 11(a)(2)(B). 
Defendants object to the substance of Hall's Memorandum, as well as both requests Hall made at 
the hearing. 
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II. ANAL YSIS 
The Court denies Hall's "motion" on three alternative grounds: no motion was filed with 
the Memorandum, Rule 59(a) is not the proper rule for a motion to reconsider, and summary 
judgment to Defendants was proper. 
A. No motion filed with Memorandum 
Lnder IRCP 7(b)(1), "[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, 
made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing .... "1 Additionally, Rule 
7(b)(3)(C) provides: 
It shall not be necessary to file a brief or memorandum of law in suppon of a 
motion, but the moving party must indicate upon the face of the motion whether 
the party desires to present oral argument or file a brief within fourteen (14) days 
with the court in support of the motion. 
Nothing in Rule 7 provides that a brief or memorandum in support of a motion may be 
considered the actual motion itself. The beginning portion of Rule 7(b)(3) does contain the 
phrase "( u]nless otherwise ordered by the court," suggesting that the trial court has the discretion 
whether to allow a memorandum in support to be considered as a motion also. 
The Court hereby exercises its discretion by denying Hall's request to treat her 
Memorandum as a motion also. Rule 7(b)(l) plainly indicates that when a party makes an 
application to the court for an order, it shall be by motion. The Rule does not provide that sLlch 
an application can be made by simply a memorandum in support. The Court therelore finds 
Hall's Memorandum in Support procedurally improper because no motion was properly filed in 
accordance \\lith IRCP 7(b)(1). 
1 (emphasis added). 
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Any oral motion made at the hearing on January 23, 2012, was untimely and cannot be 
considered a proper motion under Rule 7. 
B. Rule 59(a) not proper for a motion to reconsider 
The Court also finds, alternatively, that Hall's Memorandum was not brought under the 
correct rule. IRCP 7(b)(1) provides that a motion to the court "shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefor including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any, under which it is filed, 
and shall sct forth the relief or order sought." In this case, Hall's Memorandum cites {RCP 59(a), 
which provides that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons .... " Nothing in Rule 59(a) provides for 
a motion to reconsider when, as in this case, there has been no lrial. 
The Court denies Hall's request to treat her Memorandmll as a motion for reconsideration 
brought under Rule 11(a)(2)(B). The Court finds that Hall's Memorandum, even if the C01.111 
considered it an actual motion under Rule 7(b)(1), was not procedurally proper because it failed 
to cite the appropriate Rule, thereby failing to give Defendants notice of the precise grounds for 
her request. 
c. Summary judgment to Defendants was proper 
Alternatively, even if the Court agreed to treat Hall's Memorandum as a motion for 
reconsideration properly brought under Rule 11(a)(2)(13), the Court would still deny Hall's 
motion on its merits because summary judgment to Defendants was proper in the first place" 
--------~----
2 The well-known standard of review on summary judgment was set forth in the Court's prior decision. It is hereby 
incorporated by reference. 
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When Defendants moved for summary judgment, they produced several affidavits. In the 
affidavit of Johnson, he described how he has actual, personal knowledge of the applicable 
standard of can: for Pocatello and PMC, and he stated that he did not violate the standard of care 
in his treatment of Hall. The atIidavits of Drs. Kurtis Holt and Randall Fowler also described 
how they have actual, personal knowledge of the standard of care for physicians supervising 
physician's assistants in Pocatello and PMC, and they stated that they did not violate that 
standard of care in their supervision ofJohnson. lIall did not challenge the admissibility of those 
affidavit opinions. Hall's response in opposition was based solely on the affidavit of Dr. David 
Howman. 
Assuming that Hall's claims are properly treated as medical malpractice claims-vl/hich 
IS addressed below-the Defendants' affidavits successfully shifted the burden in summary 
judgment to Hall to produce a qualified expert opinion in accordance with Idaho Code § 6-1012, 
Hall had to provide at least some evidence that Defendants violated the applicable standard of 
care in her case in order to survive summary judgment. Hall responded by submiUing the 
affidavit of Dr. Bowman, but the Court found it inadmissible in its entirety for lack of 
foundation. As a consequence, Hall had no other admissihle evidence that Defendants violated 
the standard of care. Therefore, Hall failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact necessitating a trial on the medical malpractice claims. Accordingly, the Court held 
that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment, 
In her current motion, Hall does not challenge the Court's ruling that Dr. Bow1nan's 
affidavit was inadmissible. She argues that the Court should have denied summary judgment 
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because Defendants did not acknowledge or admit Hall's allegations that Johnson 
inappropriately groped her. She also argues that Defendants never claimed that the alleged 
groping would not violate the standard of care. Hall also argues that Defendants never 
contradicted Dr. Bowman's statement that the alleged groping violated the state\X;ide ethical 
standards for physician'S assistants. 
Hall's argument concerning Dr. Bowman's statement fails because the Court previously 
found Dr. Bowman's affidavit inadmissible, and Hall has not challenged that ruling. Hall's other 
arguments primarily depend on whether her intentional tort claims were properly treated as 
medical malpractice claims. 
In its summary judgment decision, the Court noted that although Hall brought intentional 
tort claims, her entire case would be treated as a standard medical malpractice case rather than an 
ordinary tort case. The Court acknowledges that some additional explanation is necessary to 
clarify that particular ruling, but the overall outcome remains the same. 
Idaho Code § 6-1012, which governs medical malpractice cases, contains the following 
provision concerning cases which fall under its purview: 
lA ]ny case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any person, 
brought against any [health care provider] ... on account of the provision of or 
failure to provide health care or on account of any matter incidental or reluted 
thereto .... 
Such cases falling under this definition must comply with the other provisions of 6-1012, which 
requires the opinion of an expert witness to prove a violation of the applicable standard of 
healthcare. 
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Obviously, not every conceivable lawsuit against a health eare provider would require 
compliance with 6-1012. In Hough v, Fry, the plaintiff fell and was injured while using a balance 
board as part of her supervised physical therapy treatment. 3 The plaintiff attempted to sue her 
physical therapist under a theory of ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice, but the 
Idaho Supreme COUti stated: 
Hough argues that § 6-1012 should not be read to require expert testimony every 
time a provider of medical care is sued for negligence, We agree, \Ve can 
conceive of circumstances where the alleged act of negligence is so far removed 
or unrelated to the provision of medical care that § 6-1012 would not apply. This, 
however, is not one of those cases. The act complained of was so directly related 
to providing Hough with physical therapy that it cannot be reasonably argued that 
§ 6-1012 does not apply.4 
Thus, the plaintiff in Hough still had to comply with the requirements of 6-1012 in order to 
survive summary judgment. 
Similarly, this Court recogmzes that there are conceivable circumstances where the 
healthcare provider's alleged act of intentional tort is so far removed from or unrelated to the 
provision ofmcdieal care that 6-1012 should not apply. However, Hall's case is not one of those 
circumstances. The intentional torts a1legedly took place during and in connection with the 
provision of medical treatment-listening to a heartbeat with a stethoscope. Surely these alleged 
aCls fal! under the purview of 6-1012, especially in light of the language including "any mattcr 
incidental or related" to the provision of medical care. Other than thc Idaho Suprcme Court's 
statement in Hough, no Idaho case has addressed precisely how a court should determine if a 
3 131 Idaho 230, 231·32, 953 P.2d 980, 981·82 (1998). 
4 fd. at 233,953 P.2d at 983. 
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claim against a healthcare provider is related enough to the provision of healtheare such that the 
claims should be required to comply with the expert witness provisions of 6-1 012. However, this 
Court finds that due to the proximity and connection betv,reen the alleged acts of intentional tort 
and the provision of medical care, Hall's claims should be required 10 comply with 6-1012. This 
Court's holding is bolstered by the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in Litz v. Robinson, where 
the Court stated: 
[W]e conclude that Litz was required to comply with I.e. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. 
Litz's later attempt to escape the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 by 
artfully labeling his cause of action as a claim for the intentional inDiction of 
emotional distress is not persuasive in consideration that the underlying nature of 
Litz's claim, as pled in his complaint and in further documentation suhmitted to 
the district court, was inextricably intertwined with a claim of negligence.s 
Thus, it is apparent that the Idaho appellate courts disfavor allowing plaintiffs to escape the 
requirements of 6-1012 and 6-1013 by "artfully" labeling their causes of action as something 
other than medical malpractice when the alleged actions are connected to and intertwined with 
the provision of medical care. 
Obviously, in an ordinary intentional tort claim, a defendant could not be granted 
summary judgment without submitting at least some evidence refuting the plaintiff"s allegations 
of what events took place. In this case, if Hall's intentional tort claims were treated as such 
instead of medical malpractice claims, Defendants could not be granted summary judgment 
\vithout at least first denying that inappropriate touching took place. However, when the case is 
tn:alcd as a medical malpractice case, lIall's own spccific allegations of what took place are not 
5 ]31 Idaho 282,284,955 P.2d J 13, J]5 (Cl. App. 1997). 
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as important as an expert's opinion that such conduct violated the standard of care. Even though 
Johnson's own affidavit did not directly deny that he groped Hall, his qualified opinion that he 
did not violate the standard of care is enough to shift the burden of production to Hall in 
summary judgment, because that is how medical malpractice cases proceed under Idaho law. 
Further1TIore, the doctors' opinions that they did not violate the standard of care in supervising 
their physician's assistant were enough the shift the burden of production in summary judgment 
to Hall. Since the only expert opinion produced by Hall in response was found inadmissibk, the 
Defendants' affidavits stood unopposed. Thus, summary judgment was proper. Therefore, even 
if the Court treated I I all 's Memorandum as a procedurally proper motion, the motion is denied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Hall's Memorandum was procedurally improper because there was no motion filed with 
the Memorandum. Alternatively, Hall's Memorandum was procedurally improper because it 
failed to cik an appropriate rule as grounds for the request. The Court denies Hall's requests to 
treat her Memorandum as a proper motion for reconsideration brought under lRCP 11 (a)(2)(B). 
Additlonally and alternatively, even if the Court treated Hall's Memorandum as a proper motion 
for reconsideration, the motion fails on its merits because summary judgment was proper. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED February 27, 2012. 
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